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Rights, Wrongs, and Comparative
Justifications
Vera Bergelson
Abstract
The goal of this article is to rethink the relationship between the concepts of justifi-
cation and wrongdoing, which play vital roles in the theory of criminal law. Read-
ing George P. Fletcher’s new book, The Grammar of Criminal Law, in the context
of his earlier scholarship has led me to one major disagreement with Fletcher as
well as with the traditional criminal law doctrine: for Fletcher and many others,
wrongdoing and justification mutually exclude each other; for me, they do not.
Consider a hypothetical: a group of people are captured by criminals. The crimi-
nals are about to kill everyone but then they have a change of heart and offer their
victims a deal: if Jack rapes Jill, the criminals will let everyone go. If not, no one’s
life will be spared. Realizing that this is the only way to save several lives, includ-
ing Jill’s own, Jack reluctantly agrees. Jill, on the other hand, vehemently protests
that she would rather die than be violated. When Jack attempts to overpower her,
Jill fights back and seriously injures Jack. At that moment, the police arrive and
take everyone into custody. It appears that both Jack and Jill have valid defenses
of justification – Jack can successfully claim necessity, and Jill can successfully
claim self-defense. But is it fair to say that the two are equally right or that neither
of them has committed any wrongdoing?
Focusing on the problem of incompatible justifications, I suggest that we should
revise our understanding of justifications in general. Specifically, I argue that, in
certain circumstances, justifiable conduct may be wrongful; that in a conflict be-
tween two incompatible justifications, one side may be more right than the other;
and that justifications should be viewed not as a homogenous group in which each
defense has equal importance but as a hierarchical structure in which the place af-
forded to a defense is determined by its rationale and effect on the rights of others.
The top priority belongs to justifications that do not violate rights of others and,
in addition, compel others to behave in a cooperative way (the public duty de-
fenses). The intermediate priority belongs to justifications that neither violate
rights of others nor create in others a duty to cooperate (the “special relationship”
and autonomy defenses). Finally, the lowest priority belongs to the defense of ne-
cessity, which, by design, may involve violation of rights of innocent, unoffending
individuals.
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RIGHTS, WRONGS, AND COMPARATIVE 
JUSTIFICATIONS. 
Vera Bergelson* 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Grammar of Criminal Law1 (“The Grammar”) marks a new 
chapter in George Fletcher’s exploration of the fundamental principles 
of criminal law. Although unquestionably self-standing, The Grammar 
revisits and brings to new light numerous themes and theories that have 
been at the center of Fletcher’s scholarship for the past thirty years.  In 
this article, I try to capitalize on this quality of The Grammar as I move 
back and forth in time addressing some old and some new ideas 
permeating Fletcher’s “mega text.”  Specifically, I examine the 
relationship between the theories of wrongdoing and justification as I 
puzzle over the different nature and effect of various defenses of 
justification. 
The Grammar premises its quest for the universal principles of 
criminal law on the concept of punishment.  Every organized human 
community has a way to punish its members.  Where there is a practice 
of punishment, there must be a body of legal criteria for determining 
when the punishment is to be imposed.2  That for which the punishment 
is imposed is wrongdoing.3  Wrongdoing, as Fletcher sees it, can mean 
one of three things: (a) a breach of duty; (b) harm to legally protected 
interests; or (c) violation of a norm.  The duty-based system focuses 
entirely on the actor and the inherent wrongfulness of transgressing 
against one’s duty.4  The harm-based system criminalizes harm or 
offense to others (using Feinbergian terms) accompanied by a right 
 
 
*
 Associate Professor, Rutgers School of Law-Newark; J.D., University of Pennsylvania; 
Ph.D., Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies at the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union.  I 
am grateful to Kim Ferzan, Anna Gelpern, George Thomas, and Mark Weiner for their generous 
suggestions and critical comments. 
 
1
 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, 
INTERNATIONAL (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript on file with the Cardozo Law Review) 
[hereinafter GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT] 
 
2
 Id. at 383. 
 
3
 Id. at 494. 
 
4
 Id. at 58, 62. 
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violation.5  Finally, the norm-based system addresses conduct, which 
the society finds seriously undesirable.6  In the norm-based system, 
offenders are punished, at least in part, for their disrespect of the legal 
order.7 
For Fletcher, the three theories of criminal wrongdoing are of equal 
stature and independent of one another.  While being sympathetic to all 
three, Fletcher clearly favors the last one.  This choice is consistent with 
his vertical, “top-down” conception of the law, which focuses on the 
relationship between the perpetrator and the state.  The state makes laws 
and rightfully demands that the individual respect them.  If the 
individual does not, he commits wrongdoing and deserves punishment.8  
If, on the other hand, the individual does not unjustifiably violate a legal 
norm, he is morally right and other people may use neither penal 
sanctions nor private force against him. 
This understanding of wrongdoing troubles me on several levels.  
First, I disagree with Fletcher’s emphasis on the norm violation as 
opposed to the intrinsic quality of an act.9  If all Fletcher means to say is 
that, to justify criminal punishment, an act must be not only intrinsically 
wrong but also prohibited by a legislative act, he is certainly right.  
However, the way Fletcher insists that the “intrinsic quality of the deed 
and the violation of the norm are two distinct perspectives on 
wrongdoing”10 and the choice of one’s focus “highlights a certain way 
of constructing the criminal law”11 suggests to me that he chooses one 
perspective over the other rather than combines both.  By choosing 
norm violation as his focus, Fletcher allows such values as autonomy 
and dignity only secondary roles in his theory of wrongdoing.  Like 
Fletcher, I distinguish two different meanings of wrongfulness but, 
unlike him, I derive the concept of punishment from the concept of 
wrongdoing and not vice versa.  Accordingly, for me, an act that does 
not constitute a punishable wrongdoing may still be wrongful as a 
significant violation of another person’s autonomy or dignity. 
Second, I conceptually disagree with the unilateral character of 
wrongdoing in Fletcher’s criminal theory.  At one point in the book, 
Fletcher reflects whether the correct picture of crime is “one of 
aggression, of line-crossing, as suggested in the beginning of Chapter 
 
 
5
 Id. at 60.  Fletcher defines “harm” more narrowly as “irreversibly negative impact on the 
protected interests of another.” Id. (emphasis added).  I don’t quite see why negative impact has 
to be irreversible to constitute harm.  Does Fletcher mean for instance that wrongful infliction of 
pain or injury that later heals is not harm? 
 
6
 Id. at 63-65. 
 
7
 GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 88. 
 
8
 Id. at 493 (defining wrongdoing as “unjustified violation of the statutory law or at least of 
the basic norms of the legal culture”). 
 
9
 Id. at 48-50. 
 
10
 Id. at 46. 
 
11
 Id. at 50. 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art40
BERGELSON.TO.AUTHOR.2[1] 3/14/2007  10:27:40 PM 
2007] COMPARATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS  103 
One?  Or is the better picture of crime one of interaction, of victim and 
offender together generating the homicide, the rape, or the 
embezzlement?”12  Wary of “political implications” that might follow if 
we think of crime “as the product of interaction rather than as suffering 
caused by unidirectional aggression,”13 Fletcher excludes the victim’s 
conduct from consideration of the perpetrator’s wrongdoing.  I believe 
this to be conceptually unsound.  How can we tell whether the 
perpetrator acted wrongfully when he punched his victim in the nose 
unless we know what the victim did to the perpetrator?  Perhaps he 
consented, and the punch was a part of a boxing match.  Or perhaps the 
victim had attacked the perpetrator first and the perpetrator had to 
defend himself.  In my view, the concept of wrongdoing makes sense 
only when a criminal encounter is seen as a conflict of individual rights 
and duties, and not as an independent act of boundary-crossing.14 
My disagreement with the theory of wrongdoing presented in The 
Grammar leads me to reexamine Fletcher’s views regarding 
justification and, specifically, the problem of incompatible 
justifications.  That problem arises, for instance, when two parties attack 
each other under competing claims of justification.15  Who is right: an 
 
 
12
 Id. at 371-72. 
 
13
 GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 372. 
 
14
 In The Grammar, Fletcher first seems to support the contextualized approach as he 
maintains that, under the norm-based theory, wrongdoing means “not simply ‘causing harm,’ but 
‘causing harm under particular circumstances.’”  Id. at 64.  Yet shortly thereafter, he indicates 
that he rejects that view.  Id. at 65.  See also George Fletcher, The Nature of Justification, in 
ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 175, 175-86 (Stephen Shute ed., 1993) (arguing against 
the unity theory of justification).  Could it be that Fletcher has “thrown the baby out with the bath 
water,” i.e. while properly rejecting the unity thesis, he has also rejected the contextualized 
approach in general?  That might explain, for instance, his opposition to the theory of 
comparative criminal liability that views crime as interaction and assigns liability based on the 
conduct of both the perpetrator and the victim.  See GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 
190, 371-72. 
 
15
 In a very basic form, Douglas Husak defined a conflict of justifications as a situation that 
involves two actors, A and B, where: 
“(1) A performs action x and B performs action y; 
(2) Actions x and y are justified; and 
(3) Actions x and y conflict.” 
Douglas N. Husak, Conflicts of Justification, 18 L. and PHIL. 41, 44 (1999).  This definition, 
however, is not of much help unless we can determine when two actions are in conflict, and 
Husak persuasively shows that there is no obvious answer to this question.  Id.  I recognize the 
difficulty of providing a universal definition of a conflict and I will not attempt it here.  Instead, at 
the risk of being over-inclusive, I will consider actions x and y in conflict if (a) action x infringes 
upon a right of B that is normally protected by criminal law and (b) action y infringes upon a 
right of A that is normally protected by criminal law.  For example, if A attacks B and B uses 
force in self-defense, their actions are in conflict: A attacks B’s right not to be assaulted, and B 
attacks A’s right not to be assaulted.  These rights are normally protected by criminal law.  
However, in this conflict, A, being the aggressor, has lost his right not to be assaulted by B.  
That’s why in my definition I emphasize that the affected rights are normally protected by 
criminal law, although not all participants of the conflict may justifiably claim them during the 
conflict. 
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inmate trying to escape from prison under a valid claim of necessity or a 
prison guard trying to stop him?  A man trying to cut off his friend’s 
gangrenous foot in order to save that friend’s life or that friend fighting 
against the unwanted surgery?  Since, pursuant to my understanding of 
wrongdoing, an act does not have to be right in order to be justified, it is 
that “intrinsic quality” of each party’s act that determines the outcome 
in a conflict of incompatible justifications. 
Consequently, this Article has two goals.  Its narrow goal is to 
revisit the problem of incompatible justifications and suggest a way to 
refine its solution.  The broader goal is more ambitious.  I attempt to 
refute the tacit presumption that all justification defenses are alike: if the 
intrinsic quality of two justified acts may be different, there must be 
something in the nature of each particular justification that determines 
its comparative value.  I conclude that, based on their effect on the 
rights of the participants in a conflict, justification defenses have 
different hierarchical status and should be analyzed comparatively. 
 
I.     CLASSIFICATION OF JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES AND THEIR 
REQUIREMENTS 
 
A paradigmatic defense of justification provides that a person who 
has broken the law and committed a prima facie offense nevertheless 
did “a good thing, or the right or sensible thing, or a permissible thing to 
do, either in general or at least in the special circumstances of the 
occasion.”16  Depending on the specific values lying in their foundation, 
all justifications may be divided into four groups: those based on (i) a 
public duty; (ii) a “special relationship;” (iii) autonomy; and (iv) 
efficiency. 
The public duty defense is available to a person acting either under 
an official capacity (a public servant)17 or court order18 or a duty or 
authority to assist or act on behalf of a public officer.19  For example, a 
sheriff is justified in entering upon a person’s land and taking control of 
 
 
16
 J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 1, 2 (1956-57). 
 
17
 Modern penal codes provide general justification for conduct that is “required or 
authorized by law.”  Some statutes specifically require that the actor be a public servant.  Actors 
may include members of the military, police officers and other law enforcement personnel.  
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 534-36, 558, 565-66 (4th ed. 2003). 
 
18
 “A public officer is justified in detaining an individual, in using a reasonable amount of 
force against the person of another, or in taking or destroying another’s property, when he is 
acting pursuant to a valid court order requiring or authorizing him so to act.”  Id. at 534. 
 
19
 For example, all states permit citizen arrests when a felony is committed in the presence of 
the individual carrying out the arrest, or when an individual is asked to help to apprehend a 
suspect by the police.  Id. at 558-59. 
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art40
BERGELSON.TO.AUTHOR.2[1] 3/14/2007  10:27:40 PM 
2007] COMPARATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS  105 
that person’s property without the owner’s consent, if the sheriff acts 
pursuant to a judicial attachment order. 
The “special relationship” defenses justify certain actors in their 
use of force against another person for the purpose of promoting the 
welfare, discipline or safety of that person or other people.  For 
example, a parent of a minor child is justified in using reasonable force 
for the purpose of promoting the child’s welfare (e.g., putting a warm 
coat on a three-year-old despite the latter’s vigorous objections).  
Similarly, a schoolteacher is justified in using reasonable force upon a 
student for the purpose of enforcing school discipline.  And a doctor is 
justified in using force for the treatment that would promote physical or 
mental health of a patient either with the patient’s consent or without it 
in a situation of emergency when no one competent to consent is 
available.20 
The autonomy defenses include those protecting people’s negative 
rights in their person and property (self-defense, defense of another, 
defense of a dwelling, and defense of property), as well as certain 
positive rights (consent).21 
Finally, the necessity (balance of evils) defense is designed to 
promote considerations of efficiency.  To qualify for the defense of 
necessity, which is viewed sometimes as a paradigmatic defense of 
justification,22 the defendant has to prove that the harm or evil he was 
able to avoid was greater than the harm or evil brought about by his 
nominally criminal conduct.  To be justified, the perpetrator must prove 
that he both (i) objectively made the right choice23 and (ii) subjectively 
was motivated by the need to prevent more serious harm or evil.  For 
example, mountain climbers lost in a snow storm would be justified if, 
in order to save their lives, they took refuge in someone’s vacant cabin 
and appropriated the owner’s provisions.24  In contrast, if they 
committed the break-in because they believed it to be a lesser evil than 
remaining hungry for the next few hours, they would not be entitled to 
the defense.25  Neither would they be justified if they committed the 
 
 
20
 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(4) (1980). 
 
21
 Consent may play an inculpatory or an exculpatory role.  In the first case, non-consent is an 
element of an offense; in the second case, consent is a defense.  Conceptually, consent may serve 
as a defense only in instances of consensual bodily harm.  Currently, this defense has very limited 
application.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(2)(b); see also Vera Bergelson, The Right to Be 
Hurt: Testing the Boundaries of Consent, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). 
 
22
 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (treating the defense of the choice of evils as a 
model for other justifications). 
 
23
 Many states grant justification to a reasonably mistaken actor who causes harm to another 
person (e.g., in putative self-defense).  I share Fletcher’s belief that it is more accurate to analyze 
mistake as excuse rather than justification.  See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL 
LAW 371-72, 762 (1978). We exculpate the mistaken actor due to his cognitive impairment and 
assuming that he would have behaved differently had he known the true facts. 
 
24
 See  MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 2, at 9. 
 
25
 See  MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 2, at 12 (pointing out that “one who takes a life in 
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break-in not out of fear for their lives but driven by desire to have a 
party.26 
One of Fletcher’s important contributions to the theory of criminal 
law is his persuasive argument that the defense of justification mandates 
that the perpetrator (i) be aware of the justifying circumstances and (ii) 
act for the specific purpose of achieving the beneficial outcome.  That 
requirement ensures that only the perpetrator who acted in good faith 
and in fact had an important reason to overstep a prohibitory norm be 
justified.  For example, self-defense or defense of another, in addition to 
the awareness of the attack, its imminence and seriousness, also requires 
proof of the defendant’s purpose to protect oneself or another from that 
attack.  Similarly, the “special relationship” defense requires that a 
parent using physical force to discipline a child, in addition to the 
knowledge of the child’s misconduct, had purpose to promote the 
child’s welfare.27 
I agree with Fletcher (or perhaps even go farther than he does) in 
requiring the perpetrator to have justificatory knowledge and purpose to 
qualify for most defenses of justification.  At the same time, I recognize 
that a whole class of public duty defenses does not mandate a particular 
purpose; mere knowledge of the justifying circumstances is enough.  
Intuitively, that makes sense: a police officer should not arrest people 
without a probable cause, and an executioner should not put people to 
death without an execution order.  If, say, an executioner kills a death-
row inmate, exactly at the same time and in the same manner as directed 
in the execution order, yet unaware of that order, the executioner should 
be guilty of murder.  However, it seems ludicrous to deny the 
executioner a valid defense merely because he was not driven by the 
desire to advance the ideals of justice.  As long as he acts with the 
knowledge of, and pursuant to, the prescribed procedure, he may have 
any reason for doing the job. 
 
order to avoid financial ruin does not act from a justifying necessity”). 
 
26
 See  MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 2, at 11 (stating that, to qualify for the defense of 
necessity, “the actor must actually believe that his conduct is necessary to avoid an evil”); R. v. 
Dadson, 4 Cox. C.C. 358 (1850) (holding that, for a successful defense of justification, not only 
must the circumstances of justification appear in the case but the defendant must have known of 
those circumstances).  See also, George P. Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A 
Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23 UCLA L. REV. 293, 318-21 (1975) (arguing that, when consent serves 
as a defense, the actor must be aware of it); Anthony M. Dillof, Unraveling Unknowing 
Justification, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1547, 1595-1600 (2002) (arguing in favor of subjective 
theory of justification).  But see Larry Alexander, Lesser Evils: A Closer Look at the 
Paradigmatic Justification, 24 LAW & PHIL. 611, 626-36 (2005) (arguing that self-defense but 
not other defenses requires defendant’s knowledge of justifying circumstances); Paul Robinson, A 
Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 
266, 288-91 (1975) (arguing that claims of justification should prevail regardless of the actor’s 
state of mind). 
 
27
 See  MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(2)(a).  See also LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 536-37. 
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The special nature of the public duty defense was observed two-
and-one-half centuries ago by Blackstone.28  Like all justification 
defenses of that time, the public duty defense was public in character.29  
But, unlike any other justification, that defense was not merely a 
permission to overstep a prohibitory norm, it was a “civil duty, and 
therefore not only justifiable, but commendable, where the law 
require[d] it.”30 
This characteristic of the public duty defense is responsible for its 
two significant distinctions.  Firstly, it explains why we do not require 
the perpetrator to have a proper purpose in order to claim the defense.  
Normally, we want to know why the perpetrator chose to break a 
prohibitory norm and cause harm.  For example, under the current law, 
a person may not give effective consent to serious bodily harm.  As I 
argue elsewhere, this rule should be revised.31  But even if we agree to 
recognize an individual’s power to authorize his own death or injury, 
we would still want the perpetrator to demonstrate a valid, benevolent 
reason for the harmful act. 
This requirement is mandated by the fact that consent, even 
combined with a request, creates a very weak content-independent 
reason for action, compared to, say, a threat or order by an authority.32  
For example, I may request that my friend cut off my foot.  If he does 
not want to do that, he is under no duty to obey.  If, on the other hand, 
he follows my request, and later, as a defendant in a criminal 
prosecution, claims a defense of justification, the court may rightfully 
 
 
28
 Blackstone specifically addressed only the public official’s defense but same is true with 
respect to all public duty defenses.  
 
29
 For example, a person could be justified for killing another only if: (i) the killing was 
absolutely commanded by the law in the execution of public justice; (ii) it was permitted by the 
law if necessary to maintain public order by public officers in performance of their legitimate 
duties; and (iii) when it was committed by a private party to prevent a forcible and atrocious 
crime, itself punishable by death.  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 178-81 (1st ed. 1769).  The first two of the three circumstances clearly refer to conduct 
authorized by society as a whole.  The last one is quasi-public as well.  The important difference 
between it and killing in self-defense, which at the time of Blackstone was only excusable, is that 
hindering the perpetration of a capital offense was seen as serving the interests of law and order, 
whereas self-defense was seen merely as an understandable manifestation of the instinct of self-
preservation.  In this regard, I disagree with a common explanation that prevention of a capital 
offense was justifiable because the aggressor, by attempting that forcible and atrocious crime, has 
forfeited his right to life, thus allowing any citizen to “execute” him.  See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, 
New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher’s 
Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61, 65 n. 19 (1984) [hereinafter Dressler, New 
Thoughts].  Attempts were merely misdemeanors under the common law and not punishable by 
death.  In addition, this theory does not explain the difference in the treatment of self-defense and 
justifiable homicide in prevention of a capital offense. 
 
30
 BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at 178. 
 
31
 See generally Bergelson, supra, note 21. 
 
32
 See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 413 (1988).  Based on Raz’s 
definition, a “reason is content-independent if there is no direct connection between the reason 
and the action for which it is a reason.”  Id. at 35. 
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question him: “Why did you do that?  Why, being under no obligation, 
did you choose to break a conduct rule and cause harm to another 
person?”  The public official does not have to answer this question 
exactly because he is not a free moral agent: he follows a prescribed 
procedure and is not supposed to make independent moral choices.33  
Instead, he is required to act as a public agent, under the duty and 
authority delegated to him by the state. 
Secondly, the kind of permission that accompanies the public duty 
to act is different from the permission provided by other justification 
defenses.  All public officials—a policeman performing a valid arrest, a 
sheriff taking possession of the debtor’s property pursuant to a court 
judgment, or an executioner giving the prisoner a lethal injection in 
accordance with the execution order—act under the right to act that 
way.  In contrast, people acting in self-defense, or pursuant to necessity 
or parental authority act merely under a privilege. 
 
II.     JUSTIFICATION: A RIGHT OR A PRIVILEGE? 
 
What is the difference between a right and a privilege?  In his 
influential work, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld pointed out that we often 
use the term “right” indiscriminately to express a range of ideas.34  He 
distinguished the concept of a “right” in the strict sense from other 
similar concepts by putting each of them in a correlative pair.35  
Pursuant to this typology, a right is a claim by one person against 
another.  The correlative of a right is a duty or, using Judith Jarvis 
Thomson’s term, a behavioral constraint.36  If X has a right to life, 
others have a duty not to kill him.37  If X has a right to kill Y, others 
(including Y himself) have a duty not to prevent X from killing Y.38 
 
 
33
 See, e.g., State v. Bridges, 955 P.2d 833 
, 834 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that, since the prosecutor has no discretion to decline to 
prosecute someone who satisfies the definition of a persistent offender, a claim that the 
prosecution was racially motivated is invalid).  To the extent a public official may exercise 
discretion, we do require a valid reason for his decisions (e.g., that a decision to prosecute not be 
racially motivated).  See, e.g, Armstead v. Town of Harrison, 579 F. Supp 777, 779 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984). 
 
34
 WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, I, in CONCEPTIONS AS 
APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 23, 36 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 
1923) (observing that “the term ‘rights’ tends to be used indiscriminately to cover what in a given 
case may be a privilege, a power, or an immunity, rather than a right in the strictest sense”). 
35
 Id. 
 
36
 See Thomson, , infra note 64, at 61-78. 
 
37
 Hohfeld, supra note 34, at 36-38. 
 
38
 Some scholars pointed out that people never have a right to do anything.  Instead, they 
have a liberty (privilege) to do the same and a right that others do not wrongfully interfere with 
this liberty.  See Glanville Williams, The Concept of Legal Liberty, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY (Robert S. Summers ed., 1968); Husak, supra note 15, at 57 n.48.  Using this 
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On the other hand, a privilege is merely one’s freedom from the 
right or claim of another; its correlative is not a duty but a “no right.”  If 
Y unlawfully attacks X, X may use force in self-defense.  X acts under a 
privilege, and Y has no right that X not act that way.  On the other hand, 
Y does not have a duty to stay put and let X kill him.  Y may quite 
lawfully run away.39 
The distinction between a right and a privilege is crucial when we 
consider various justification defenses.  As we have already seen, at 
least one large group of defenses is not like all other ones in terms of its 
requirements, the nature of permission to act, and consequences to all 
other parties.  We will see later that privilege defenses are not all alike 
either but, for now, it may be helpful to focus on the difference between 
rights and privileges and see whether it adds anything meaningful to the 
old debate about the nature of justification defenses and incompatible 
justifications. 
The essence of the debate was whether justification presumes that 
the defendant’s conduct was “right” or merely “not wrong.”  Fletcher 
presented one side of the debate, arguing that only laudatory actions 
deserved justification and “one party’s having a right to engage in 
specified conduct precludes others from having a right to prevent him 
from doing so.”40  Thus, for Fletcher, in each conflict, only one party 
may be justified, and incompatible justifications are impossible by 
definition. 
In contrast, Fletcher’s opponents, including David Dolinko and 
Joshua Dressler, maintained that any “permissible” or “tolerable” 
conduct should be justified, and incompatible justifications are an 
inevitable part of life.41  Accordingly, Dressler would justify both—an 
inmate attempting an escape from prison under the valid claim of 
necessity and a prison guard attempting to stop him—whereas Fletcher 
would justify only the prison guard and, at best, excuse the inmate. 
 
terminology, an easement holder does not have a right to pass through his neighbor’s land.  What 
he has is a liberty to pass through the neighbor’s land and a right that the neighbor, as well as 
others, not wrongfully prevent him from using his easement.  I agree that this terminology is more 
accurate and, when we say “X has a right to do y,” we use conceptual shorthand.  However, as 
Williams pointed out, the use of the word “right” in its extended sense is “inveterate and probably 
beyond recall.”  Williams, supra, at 140.  For that reason, I continue using the shorthand with the 
understanding of its limitations.  Accordingly, a statement “X has a right to kill Y” is a shorthand 
for “X has a privilege to kill Y and a right that neither Y nor others wrongfully interfere with X’s 
exercise of his privilege.”  Accordingly, when I compare an act protected by a right with an act 
protected by a privilege, in its spelled-out form it is a comparison of two acts—one, protected by 
a mere privilege to act in a certain way, and the other, protected by a privilege to act in a certain 
way and a right that others do not wrongfully hinder performance of the privileged act. 
 
39
 Hohfeld, supra note 34, at 38-50. 
 
40
 George P. Fletcher, Should Intolerable Prison Conditions Generate a Justification or an 
Excuse for Escape?, 26 UCLA L. REV. 1355, 1364 (1979) [hereinafter Fletcher, Commentary]. 
 
41
 Dressler, New Thoughts, supra note 29, at 84-92.  For the economy of space, I focus on 
Dressler’s work when discussing the position opposite to Fletcher’s. 
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I think that both positions have merit and are flawed at the same 
time.  My own view is that justified conduct does not have to be 
laudatory; therefore, more than one party in a conflict may be justified.  
At the same time, the mere fact that more than one party in a conflict is 
justified does not preclude the possibility of one party being right and 
other parties being wrong. 
 
A.     Is There the Right Side of a Conflict? 
 
In most instances, if one party to a conflict is “right,” the other is 
“wrong.”  This is the basic distinction between a victim and an offender.  
Here I tend to agree with Fletcher although, unlike him, I do not believe 
that, to be “right,” a person has to be morally and legally impeccable.  
Being “more right” or “relatively right” is a much more realistic 
requirement, particularly since numerous sociological and 
victimological studies show that victims are often active participants of 
the crime42 and their actions are similar to those of the offenders.43  Yet, 
it would be unfair to treat the two parties equally when one of them was 
responsible for a much lesser wrong than the other.  For that reason, I 
disagree with Dressler who refuses to distinguish between two 
conflicting actors whenever each of them is independently justified. 
True, justifications often represent competing societal values, and 
it is not always easy to tell which party is more right.  However, if that 
difficulty were a sufficient reason to withhold judgment, we would have 
to do so in many other circumstances as well.  For example, we say that 
a justified person is right and an excused person is wrong when they 
fight against each other.  But if the basis for our indecision in cases of 
incompatible justifications is the clash of values, why aren’t we also 
morally paralyzed when the values underlying justification clash with 
the values underlying excuse?  Shouldn’t we, to be consistent, reserve 
judgment any time both parties have some kind of a defense? 
I certainly don’t think so.  The only situation, in my view, when we 
truly cannot tell who is right and who is wrong, as between two justified 
actors, is when both of them claim an identical defense of necessity.  In 
virtually all other cases, such conflict has been logically and 
 
 
42
 Some researchers have found victim precipitation rates to be as high as 49-67% when 
victim precipitation was defined as any situation in which provocative behavior of the victim 
played an important role in the perpetrator’s decision to act or encouraged the offender into a 
progression of violence.  See, e.g., Lynn A. Curtis, Victim Precipitation and Violent Crime, 21 
SOC. PROBS. 594, 597 (1974); T. A. Silverman, Victim Precipitation: An Examination of the 
Concept, in VICTIMOLOGY: A NEW FOCUS 99-109 (Israel Drapkin & Emilio Viano eds., 1974). 
 
43
 See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 42, at 597 (concluding that “distinctions between victims and 
offenders are often blurred and [are] mostly a function of who got whom first, with what weapon, 
how the event was reported, and what immediate decisions were made by the police”). 
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legislatively precluded.  The Model Penal Code, for instance, justifies 
the use of force in self-defense only if it is used against unlawful force; 
thus if one party is justified, the other party, by definition, must have 
used force unlawfully and may not claim valid self-defense.44  
Similarly, if one parent properly exercises his parental authority (e.g., 
by giving a small child prescribed medication), his act is lawful, and the 
other parent may not forcibly prevent him from doing that.45  In 
contrast, the defense of necessity is based not on individual rights but 
rather on maximization of collective benefit, and thus does not preclude 
a clash of individual interests.  Furthermore, the residual, “catch-all” 
character of that defense presupposes that the legislature has not 
attempted to preempt potential conflicts.46 
The necessity hypothetical I have in mind goes like that: a group of 
people is captured by criminals.  The criminals are about to kill 
everyone but then they have a change of heart and offer their victims a 
deal: if any two volunteers perform a gladiator fight, the criminals will 
let everyone go.  If not, no one’s life will be spared.  Jack and Bill 
volunteer in order to save the lives of the rest of the group. 
I think that both Jack and Bill should be justified under the defense 
of necessity: a gladiator fight involves harm as well as evil but those 
harm and evil are lesser than the harm and evil that would happen 
(namely, the slaughter of several innocent people) if Jack and Bill did 
nothing.47  Yet, with respect to each other, Jack and Bill certainly acted 
wrongfully: no matter how noble their motivations were, the direct 
purpose of their actions was to seriously injure each other.  Considering 
that both Jack and Bill volunteered, their conduct was not very 
wrongful,48 but to the extent it was wrongful, it was equally wrongful 
for each participant. Thus, neither of them is “more right” than the 
other, and, say, a third party would not be justified in helping either side 
 
 
44
 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1962).  
 
45
 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(1).  Unfortunately, the Model Penal Code is rather 
incoherent in its use of the terms “unlawful” and “justifiable.”  For instance, it views mistaken 
self-defense as justification.  Accordingly, a person (A) who, due to a mistaken and totally 
unreasonable perception of threat, attacks a bystander (B) is justifiable.  If “justifiable” means 
“lawful,” that presumes that B may not defend himself against A, which is absurd.  To avoid the 
absurd result, I suggest that (in addition to treating mistake as an excuse) we interpret “unlawful” 
as “prima facie unlawful” and rely on specific provisions to regulate conflicts of interests.  See, 
e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(3)(b) (disallowing the use of force against a trespasser if “the 
actor knows that the expulsion of the trespasser will expose him to substantial danger of serious 
bodily harm”). 
 
46
 In fact, when the legislature has considered and decided how to treat a specific conflict, the 
defense of necessity is unavailable.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(b), (c). 
 
47
 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(a) (providing that conduct that the actor believes 
to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable if “the harm or evil 
sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law 
defining the offense charged”). 
 
48
 See Bergelson, supra note 21.  
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against the other.  This case, however, is rather an exception; normally, 
competing justifications do not preclude one party from being more 
right than the other. 
In sum, balancing different values may be quite difficult but that 
difficulty is an inherent feature of legal, and particularly criminal, 
adjudication.  With the exception of competing claims of necessity in 
which the mens rea, actus reus, and all other relevant characteristics of 
both parties are identical, we should be able to decide who is right and 
who is wrong in a conflict of two incompatible justifications. 
 
B.     Can More Than One Person Be Justified? 
 
Fletcher has never disputed that two people may have good 
defenses as against each other.  However, he refused to “use the term 
‘justification’ indiscriminately to include all issues bearing on the 
culpability of actors as well as the propriety of acts.”49  The italicized 
part of this statement makes Fletcher’s position very clear: if one act in 
a conflict is not morally superior to the other, it is not justified at all.  
Accordingly, Fletcher denies not only conflicting justifications but also 
partial justifications. 
I find this view conceptually unsound.  I believe Fletcher is 
incorrect in his absolutist interpretation of justification.  I would argue 
that, to be justified, an actor does not have to be entirely free from 
wrongdoing.  More specifically, an act may be wrongful with respect to 
a particular party and still be justified, or, as Douglas Husak well put it, 
“[n]o one who believes that killings in self-defense are completely 
justified need suppose that the quantum of wrongfulness in all such 
killings is equivalent to that in, say, scratching one’s head.”50  I think 
Fletcher should agree with that.  Not only has he expressed similar 
discomfort with a thesis that “reduces killing in self-defense to the same 
format as killing a fly”51 but his own theory of self-defense leaves room 
for a degree of wrongdoing.  Consider Fletcher’s well-known 
hypothetical: 
Imagine that your companion in an elevator goes berserk and attacks 
you with a knife.  There is no escape: the only way to avoid serious 
bodily harm or even death is to kill him.  The assailant acts 
purposively in the sense that his means further his aggressive end.  
He does act in a frenzy or in a fit, yet it is clear that his conduct is 
 
 
49
 Fletcher, Commentary, supra note 40, at 1359 (emphasis added). 
 
50
 Douglas N. Husak, Partial Defenses, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 167, 172 (1998). 
 
51
 Fletcher, The Nature of Justification, supra note 14, at 183. 
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non-responsible.  If he were brought to trial for his attack, he would 
have a valid defen[s]e of insanity.52 
Fletcher justifies killing of the psychotic aggressor, and I think he 
is right. But can we honestly say that the killing of a sick person, who is 
not responsible for his conduct, is also laudatory, praiseworthy, or 
commendable?  In my view, it would be morally insensitive to use those 
terms or to deny any wrongdoing in the described situation.  Moreover, 
there is no need to go that far: a successful justification defense does not 
qualify the perpetrator for the Mother Theresa Award; it merely 
indicates that an act is not wrongful enough to deserve punishment. 
That same principle of insufficient wrongfulness underlies partial 
justifications.  Unlike a complete justification which reduces the 
wrongfulness of an act to such a degree that it does not merit 
punishment, a partial justification does not eliminate liability altogether; 
instead the liability is mitigated.53  A partially justified act is, therefore, 
a wrongful act that, due to certain mitigating circumstances, is less 
wrongful than that required by the charged offense. 
Similar logic applies to the conflict of complete but competing 
justifications: both acts are not wrongful enough to merit punishment; 
however, (at least)54 one act may be wrongful enough to legitimize the 
use of force by a private party.  For example, let me slightly revise the 
Jack and Bill hypothetical to make one party more wrong than the other.  
Assume that this time the criminals conditioned the release of their 
captives on Jack’s rape of Jill.  Realizing that this is the only way to 
save several lives, including Jill’s own, Jack reluctantly agrees.  Jill, on 
the other hand, vehemently protests that she would rather die than be 
violated.  When Jack attempts to overpower her, Jill fights back and 
seriously injures Jack.  At that moment, the police arrive and take 
everyone into custody.  Is either Jack or Jill criminally liable, and if not, 
can either of them claim justification? 
If we consider Jack’s act alone, it is likely to be justified, for the 
same reason as in the Jack & Bill hypothetical.  Sexual intercourse 
compelled by force involves both harm and evil.  Yet, judging from the 
objective perspective, those harm and evil are still lesser than the harm 
and evil brought about by the murder of several innocent people; thus, 
Jack deserves justification.55  At the same time, if we consider Jill’s 
 
 
52
 George P. Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A Vignette in 
Comparative Criminal Theory, 8 ISR. L. REV. 367, 371 (1973). 
 
53
 See Husak, supra note 50, at 172. 
 
54
 This parenthetical addresses the Jack & Bill exception discussed in the previous section. 
 
55
 The Model Penal Code leaves the issue open: “While there may be situations, such as rape, 
where it is hardly possible to claim that greater evil was avoided than that sought to be prevented 
by the law defining the offense, this is a matter that is safely left to the determination and 
elaboration of the courts.”  MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 cmt. 3, at 14 (1962).  On the other hand, 
according to the Model Penal Code, “the numerical preponderance in the lives saved compared to 
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conduct alone, it should be justified as well.  A person is allowed to use 
any necessary force, including deadly force, to resist forcible rape.56  
But if both acts are justified, how shall we resolve the conflict between 
Jack and Jill? 
I suggest that we follow the dichotomy described in the 
“Grammar” and conceptually separate two meanings of wrongdoing.  
Fletcher refers to the German tradition of criminal jurisprudence, which 
distinguishes the act’s incompatibility with a prohibitory norm from the 
act’s intrinsic wrongfulness.57  I find this distinction very insightful, 
although I would slightly change the emphasis and characterize the two 
meanings of wrongdoing as one relating to punishment and the other 
relating to interpersonal rights.  The defense of justification addresses 
wrongfulness in the first sense: if an act is justified, it is not sufficiently 
wrongful to merit imposition of a criminal sanction.  That, however, 
does not imply that the same act is not sufficiently wrongful not to merit 
a defensive action by another person with a conflicting interest.  Neither 
does that imply that the defensive action by the holder of a conflicting 
interest necessarily strips the initially justified party of valid 
justification. 
Obviously, not every conflicting interest should even be taken into 
account for the determination of the parties’ rights and defenses.  In 
“The Grammar,” Fletcher’s unilateral vision of wrongdoing leads him 
to confusion as to when the victim’s conduct is relevant to the 
wrongfulness of the perpetrator’s act.  He writes: 
[T]here are many situations in which victims . . . provoke the 
crime—as in the case of homicide where the doctrine of provocation 
traditionally reduced the offence from murder to manslaughter.  Yet 
there are other situations where drawing attention to the victim’s role 
seems improperly to diminish the responsibility of the offender for 
the wrongful aggression.  Any suggestion, for example, that women 
sometimes bring on sexual aggression (by scanty dressing or 
flirtatious behavior) will surely evoke howls of protest.  The question 
is not so much one of fact as of perception.58 
Had Fletcher not defined wrongdoing in unilateral terms, he would 
not have had trouble differentiating between the two groups of cases.  
The first group, which, in addition to provocation cases, includes cases 
 
those sacrificed surely should establish legal justification for the act.”  Id. at 15.  The numerical 
preponderance seems to warrant Jack’s justification, even if murder is not worse than rape (one 
count of rape compared to avoiding several counts of murder). 
 
56
 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b) (1962) (providing that the use of deadly force is allowed 
in limited circumstances, including when the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect 
himself against sexual intercourse compelled by force). 
 
57
 See FLETCHER, GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 46-47. Fletcher seems to be 
sympathetic to this distinction.  However, it does not enter into his theory of criminal law as he 
does not recognize the possibility of a justified act being intrinsically wrong. 
 
58
 Id. at 371-72. 
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of perfect and imperfect (due to excessive use of force)59 self-defense, 
shares an important element.  In all cases forming that group, the victim 
was the initial aggressor.  He attacked the perpetrator’s legally protected 
interests and, because of that, lost or reduced his own right not to be 
hurt.60  In short, the victim, by his own actions, has changed his legal 
and moral status with respect to the perpetrator, which reduced or 
eliminated the perpetrator’s liability for the harm to the victim. 
In contrast, a scantily dressed, flirtatious woman did not change 
her status with respect to the sex offender because the sex offender did 
not have a right that the woman dress or act conservatively.  What 
distinguishes the two groups of cases cited by Fletcher is that the 
perpetrator in the first group suffered an attack on his legally protected 
right, whereas the perpetrator in the second group had no relevant right 
to start with.  Accordingly, self-defense and provocation are valid 
defenses to homicide, and a “scanty dress” is not a valid defense to rape. 
With this clarification, we can now return to incompatible 
justifications.  If I am correct that justification does not imply the 
absence of wrongdoing, it is possible to have two justified parties, one 
of which is more right than the other.  Sometimes, one party being more 
right means that the other party is wrong—not only with respect to the 
first party but also in general, with respect to society, i.e. sometimes one 
party’s justification not only gives that party private rights against the 
other party but also defeats the other party’s justification.  For example, 
a person may not use self-defense against lawful force (a policeman 
with an arrest warrant); if he does, he would not be justified.  Yet in 
other instances, one party’s being more right only allows that party to 
use force against the other party but does not destroy the other party’s 
justification (e.g., Jack & Jill’s case61).  In other words, some but not all 
conflicting justifications are truly incompatible; other conflicting 
justifications do not preclude each other. 
To explain that difference, we need to go back to the right-
privilege dichotomy.  In the following section, I review what happens 
when the two competing justifications are (i) both rights, (ii) a right and 
a privilege, and (iii) both privileges. 
 
 
59
 I specify that to distinguish mistaken self-defense, which is sometimes also called 
imperfect self-defense and which, in my view, is only an excuse, see supra note 23, from self-
defense, which is imperfect due to excessive use of force and which is partial justification (and 
often partial excuse, too). 
 
60
 Naturally, in cases of provocation we may talk only about partial justification of the 
perpetrator.  The victim who punches the perpetrator in the nose has certainly lost his right not to 
be hurt at all.  Yet, he has not lost his right not to be killed; therefore, the perpetrator who 
overreacts and kills the victim may be justified only to a certain degree.  In the same way a person 
who, while acting in legitimate self-defense, oversteps the boundaries of what is necessary and 
proportionate, is responsible only for the unwarranted “extra” harm. 
 
61
 Why Jill is more right than Jack is discussed infra in Section III.C.2. 
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III.     THE HIERARCHY OF JUSTIFICATIONS 
A.     Right v. Right 
 
The public duty group of defenses tops the hierarchy of 
justifications.  Only those defenses give the perpetrator a right to break 
a prohibitory norm when necessary for the performance of his duties.  
Accordingly, only those defenses disallow others to hinder the right-
holder’s actions.  For example, a sheriff executing a valid writ of 
attachment may go on the garnishee’s land and take control of the 
garnishee’s property, and the garnishee may not force the sheriff to 
leave and may not hide his property from attachment. 
Since each public duty defense imposes on everyone an obligation 
not to act in a way that would obstruct the performance of the relevant 
public duty, these defenses cannot clash with one another.  A police 
officer may not arrest the sheriff executing the writ of attachment for 
trespass or conversion.  If he does that, he certainly would not be 
entitled to justification.  To the extent his mistake was reasonable, he 
might be able to claim excuse, i.e., concede that he was wrong but plead 
that he should not be punished due to certain explainable impairment of 
judgment. 
 
B.     Right v. Privilege 
 
Because of the special nature of right-based justifications, a person 
acting under a privilege always loses to a person acting under a right.  
As noted above, if a person acts under a right, other people have a duty 
not to act in a way that would frustrate his purpose.  In contrast, other 
people do not have a duty to constrain their behavior with respect to a 
holder of a privilege (e.g., defense of necessity).  Therefore, if a holder 
of a public duty defense finds himself in a conflict with a holder of 
necessity defense, the latter has to yield.  For instance, an inmate 
attempting to escape from prison may be justified under the necessity 
defense.  However, if a prison guard tries to stop him, the inmate has a 
duty to cooperate.  If he does not and the guard has to shoot him, the 
guard would be justified.  In contrast, if the inmate shoots the guard, no 
justification would be available to him. 
 
C.     Privilege v. Privilege 
 
As I discussed earlier, a privilege is the absence of a duty, freedom 
from the right or claim of another.  A privilege may have different 
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origins: a person may not have a duty in the first place; or a person may 
contract for a certain privilege; or a privilege may be granted by law.  A 
justification defense based on a privilege permits an actor to break a 
prohibitory norm under particular circumstances, whereas, in the 
absence of those circumstances, the actor’s conduct would be a criminal 
offense.  A privilege-based justification may be warranted by reasons of 
“special relationship,” autonomy, or efficiency. 
Naturally, from time to time, interests promoted by those defenses 
clash.  The outcome of those clashes should be decided by numerous 
considerations, including the relative (i) magnitude of the interests at 
stake; (ii) set-backs to those interests; and (iii) causative roles of the 
parties in bringing about the harm.  Yet, all those factors being equal, 
the determinative consideration should be the ranking of respective 
justification defenses based on their intrinsic qualities.  To rank each 
defense, it is helpful to conduct a simple mental experiment: see which 
of the two parties covered by conflicting defenses has a superior right to 
use force against the other. 
The “special relationship” defenses win this competition for 
several reasons.  One is that, by their very design, the victim protected 
by those defenses (a child or a person incapable of consent) is not a 
fully responsible rational agent.  As a result, the perpetrator’s 
paternalistic use of force does not constitute a measurable autonomy 
violation.  Thus, autonomy-based defenses have to lose in the face of a 
“special relationship” defense.  Moreover, the “lawful” character of the 
use of force pursuant to the defense of “special relationship” invalidates 
the use of force in self-defense and other defenses of that group.  For 
example, a student may use reasonable force against a fellow student 
who takes his cell phone and refuses to return it.  However, a student 
may not use force against a teacher who takes away the student’s cell 
phone in punishment for sending text-messages during class. 
The second reason for the priority of the “special relationship” 
privileges over other privileges is that, to qualify for a “special 
relationship” defense, the perpetrator has to act for the purpose of 
promoting a desirable social outcome and succeed in achieving it.  
Therefore, a true clash with the efficiency-based defense of necessity is 
impossible, just as it is impossible with autonomy-based defenses.  
Accordingly, if one conflicting party has a valid defense of “special 
relationship,” the other party is not justified in the use of force against 
him.  This conclusion makes a lot of sense: out of all justification 
privileges, the “special relationship” defense is the only one that 
imposes on the actor a duty, albeit discretional, to act in a certain way.  
Consequently, out of all justification privileges, the “special 
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relationship” defense is closest to the public duty defense, i.e., closest to 
the one based on the perpetrator’s right and not just privilege.62 
The fact that a true clash of the “special relationship” and any other 
justification privilege is impossible determines that only one side of the 
conflict may be justified.  For the same reason, only one side may be 
justified in a conflict between a right-based defense and any other 
defense, or in a conflict between two “autonomy” defenses (e.g., if A is 
justified in using force against B, C will not be justified in using force 
against A in protection of B).  Yet, a true clash of values is possible 
when a necessity defense competes with an autonomy defense, as in the 
Jack & Jill hypothetical.  Although both parties are justified in what 
they do, it intuitively appears that Jill is more right than Jack.  If she 
kills Jack in self-defense, she will be justified but Jack will not be 
justified if he kills Jill while trying to rape her or in response to her use 
of defensive force.  Why is that so? 
 
1.     The Theory of Rights 
 
The answer to this question depends, in part, on how we view 
Jack’s and Jill’s respective rights to physical inviolability.  One way 
would be to say that Jill has never had a right “not to be raped.”  She 
only had a limited right “not to be raped, unless such rape is beneficial 
to society.” Thus, Jack did not interfere with any right of Jill, since Jill 
did not have a right “not to be raped” in the first place. 
This perspective, known as specification, appears seriously flawed: 
if we follow the view that people’s rights are limited from the outset, we 
would not be able to explain why someone whose property was taken 
for public use or, arguably, someone whose autonomy was intruded for 
the sake of others is entitled to compensation.  For example, under the 
specification theory, the mountain climbers who, during a snow storm, 
took refuge in a vacant cabin and consumed the owner’s provisions 
would not have to compensate the owner.  That outcome would not only 
be blatantly unfair but would also disagree with a significant body of 
law.63 
 
 
62
 Yet, it is not a right, at least not with respect to the general public.  It imposes a duty to 
cooperate only on a very limited constituency of not fully responsible agents.  It has no similar 
effect on the rest of the world.  If I am present while a teacher attempts to use corporal 
punishment on a child, I am under no obligation to behave in such a way as not to prevent that 
from happening.  I may distract the teacher and let the child escape.  In contrast, if I intentionally 
distract a policeman in order to help a criminal to escape arrest, I will be guilty of a criminal 
offense. 
 
63
 In “The Grammar”, Fletcher seems to be sympathetic to the specification theory.  See 
GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 65 (opining that “its plausibility is undeniable”).  I 
disagree with that assessment and instead side with Fletcher in his powerful critique of the 
specification theory (he calls it the unity thesis) in his earlier article, The Nature of Justification.  
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A better theory is the one under which the owner of the cabin has 
unabridged property rights, and Jack and Jill each has an unabridged 
right to physical inviolability.  Those rights, however, are not absolute.  
People may lose them either voluntarily (by consent) or involuntarily 
(by an unprovoked attack on legally protected rights of others).  In 
addition, rights may be overridden although the right-holder did nothing 
to lose or reduce them.64  For example, when Jack raped Jill, he 
overrode her right not to be raped in order to preserve equally or more 
important rights of a larger group of people.  Jack’s act, albeit justifiable 
from the perspective of the state, constituted a breach of his duty to Jill 
and gave her the right to disregard his own right to physical inviolability 
and fight back. 
 
2.     Innocent Aggressors 
 
At the first glance, this theory seems paradoxical: why should Jack 
involuntarily lose his rights if he is justified?65  He may be an aggressor 
but he is an innocent aggressor.  How can it be the right thing to kill an 
innocent?  There is a two-prong answer to these questions. 
First, Jack’s “innocent” status gives him a valid public claim 
against the state that he does not deserve to be punished.  But that status 
does not necessarily give him a private claim against Jill that she not kill 
him in self-defense.  After all, an actor excused by virtue of insanity is 
also an innocent aggressor.  He also has a valid claim against the state 
that he does not deserve to be punished.  Yet, most people would justify 
an innocent victim who used deadly force to resist a homicidal 
maniac.66 
Moreover, a justified person (i.e., a person who has violated a 
prohibitory norm and now has to rely on a defense) should not be able 
to claim more inviolability than a person who has committed no 
criminal act at all.  And a person who committed no criminal act at all 
 
See supra, note 14. 
 
64
 See JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, Ceasing to Have a Right, in THE REALM OF RIGHTS 348-73 
(1990); JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, Self-Defense and Rights, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION AND RISK: 
ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY 33, 42-48 (1986); JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, Some Ruminations on 
Rights, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY 49-65 (1986); JUDITH 
JARVIS THOMSON, Rights and Compensation, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION AND RISK: ESSAYS IN 
MORAL THEORY 66-77 (1986). 
 
65
 The general consensus, which I challenge here, is that, if a person is justified, he is not an 
aggressor at all, not even an “innocent aggressor.”  See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Propter Honoris 
Respectum: A Unified Excuse of Preemptive Self-Protection, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1475, 
1481-82 (1999) (defining “innocent aggressors” as those “who appear to be attacking me without 
legal justification, but who are legally and morally nonculpable in doing so”) (emphasis added). 
 
66
 But see Laurence A. Alexander, Justification and Innocent Aggressors, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 
1177 (1987) (arguing that killing of innocent aggressors may only be excused but not justified). 
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(e.g., a sleepwalking killer) is not entitled to more inviolability than a 
homicidal maniac.67 
Compare, for example, Fletcher’s psychotic aggressor68 with 
sleepwalking Mrs. Cogdon who, in a somnambulistic state, bludgeoned 
her daughter Pat to death with an axe.69  Mrs. Cogdon was charged with 
murder but acquitted because the act of killing was deemed to be 
involuntary, and thus “was not, in law, regarded as her act at all.”70  Now, 
what if before the first fatal blow fell, Pat woke up and tried to defend 
herself – would she be justified if, after all other attempts failed, she shot 
her mother to death? 
I think she would, in part, because I see little difference between a 
sleepwalking aggressor and a psychotic aggressor.  Mrs. Cogdon killed 
Pat while acting in a dream in which she attempted to protect her 
daughter from violent intruders.  From what we know about psychosis, 
Fletcher’s aggressor could be acting under a delusion that a wild bear was 
about to attack him and he had to fight for his life.71 
I am not trying to say that there is no difference between defenses 
of excuse and justification.  Nor am I making a rather obvious point 
that, sometimes, the legal line between voluntary and involuntary 
conduct is blurred.  Instead, these examples are meant to demonstrate 
that, as long as we recognize that (a) not all justifications are equal, and 
(b) one side to a conflict may be more right even when both sides are 
justified, the relevant question in a clash of two different justifications is 
not which party is innocent but rather which justification has priority.  
As between necessity and self-defense, the latter has priority.  It has 
priority because necessity requires a breach of a duty to an innocent, 
unoffending party, whereas self-defense is always responsive and is 
permitted only to the extent necessary for the protection of an 
endangered right. 
In the Jack & Jill case, for example, Jill has never lost her right not 
to be raped; her right not to be raped was overridden.  From the 
perspective of punishment, it was overridden non-wrongfully but, from 
the perspective of Jill’s individual rights, it was a wrongful act.72  At all 
 
 
67
 Fletcher would most likely disagree with this statement.  He believes that a voluntary act is 
required in order to justify responsive use of force in self-defense.  See, e.g., GRAMMAR 
MANUSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 414-15. 
 
68
 See Fletcher, supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 
69
 Norval Morris, Somnambulistic Homicide: Ghosts, Spiders, and North Koreans, 5 RES 
JUDICATAE 29, 29-30 (1951). 
 
70
 Id. 
 
71
 See, e.g., MedlinePlus Medical Encyclopedia, 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001553.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2007) 
(defining psychosis as “a severe mental condition characterized by a loss of contact with reality”).  
Persons experiencing a psychotic episode may have hallucinations, hold delusional beliefs, 
demonstrate personality changes and exhibit disorganized thinking.  Id.   
 
72
 I accept Thomson’s distinction between infringement of a right and violation of a right to 
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moments of Jack’s attack, she retained the right that he not do that to 
her.  By disregarding Jill’s right, Jack breached his duty to Jill and lost 
his own right to physical inviolability.  That allowed Jill to fight back 
the same way she would be allowed to fight against a villainous 
aggressor. 
Naturally, having a right and defending it are two different things.  
One’s privilege to defend a violated right largely depends on the 
comparative magnitude of interests protected by the competing 
defenses.  Although the law does not necessarily favor a more important 
interest (e.g., Jill may kill Jack in order to prevent rape), a person may 
not be justified in the use of force if the magnitude of his interest is 
grossly disproportionate to that of another justified party.  For example, 
even though the cabin owner has the right that the mountain climbers 
not trespass on his property, he would not be justified if he forcibly 
evicted the mountain climbers back into the impending snow storm.73  
Similarly, the use of deadly force against an aggressor is justified only 
in protection of the most vital interests.74 
To summarize the foregoing: 
1. There are two different concepts of wrongdoing—one 
relating to private rights of an individual, and the other 
relating to punishment.  A person may commit the former 
kind of wrongdoing without committing the latter.75  One of 
such circumstances is when the perpetrator infringes upon a 
right of the victim but does so under the protection of a 
justification defense. 
2. When parties claim conflicting justifications, their rights 
against each other and their ability to retain the justified 
 
the extent it applies to justifiability of punishment but not to private rights of individuals.  Take 
her own well-known hypothetical in which a person is kidnapped by the Society of Music Lovers 
to be used for kidney dialysis in order to save the life of a famous violinist.  See Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 48-49, 59-66 (1971).  If we conclude 
that the person’s rights here were not violated but merely overridden, he should not be justified in 
fighting for his freedom.  At least legally (and, arguably, morally), that outcome would be wrong.  
Note, however, that a right violation is a necessary but not sufficient condition of one’s privilege 
to enforce that right.  See, e.g., infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. 
 
73
 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1411(4) (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-6(b)(2) (West. 
2006); 18 PA. CONST. STAT. § 507(c)(2) (2006); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06 cmt. 7(b) (1962) 
(stating a rule that a trespasser may not be expelled in circumstances in which extreme harm is 
likely to befall him).  See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(3)(b) (disallowing the use of force to 
prevent or terminate trespass “if the actor knows that the exclusion of the trespasser will expose 
him to substantial danger of serious bodily harm”). 
 
74
 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b) (providing that deadly force may be used only 
in defense against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping and sexual intercourse compelled by 
force or threat). 
 
75
 The opposite is true as well.  When Armin Meiwes killed and ate Bernd Juergen Brandes, 
he did not violate the latter’s rights since the encounter was voluntary.  Nevertheless, very few 
would deny that his act was wrongful and deserved punishment.  See Bergelson, supra note 21. 
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status against the state depend, other things equal, on the 
relative rankings of their defenses. 
3. Justifications based on the perpetrator’s right (in the 
Hohfeldian sense) top the hierarchy of justifications and rule 
out any competing justification, whether based on another 
right or privilege.  If a person acts pursuant to a right, any 
incompatible action on the part of another is simply wrong. 
4. As between justifications based on mere privileges, people 
involved in incompatible actions may retain (necessity v. 
self-defense) or lose (self-defense v. “special relationship”) 
their justified status with respect to the state.  However, if 
both parties attempt to enforce conflicting claims based on 
incompatible privileges, at least one of them always acts 
wrongfully with respect to the other.  The party who acts 
wrongfully loses his inviolability to the extent it needs to be 
disregarded in order to enforce the claim of the other party 
and presuming it is not disproportionately smaller than the 
wrongdoer’s claim of inviolability. 
5. What makes one party wrong with respect to the other is that, 
although he does not violate the law, he still violates that 
other party’s right not to be harmed.  As a result, he loses 
moral and legal parity with the victim: the victim retains his 
right not to be harmed even though that right is disregarded 
by the perpetrator, whereas the perpetrator loses his 
analogous right. 
6. Two justifications can co-exist only between competing 
privileges, other than the “special relationship” privileges, 
and can never co-exist between a right (in the Hohfeldian 
sense) and a privilege.  In most instances of co-existing 
justifications, one party is “more right” than the other. 
However, there may be cases in which both parties are 
justified yet equally wrong. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The goal of this article was to rethink the relationship between the 
theories of justification and wrongdoing, which play vital roles in 
Fletcher’s scholarship.  Reading the “The Grammar” in the context of 
Fletcher’s other work has led me to one major disagreement with 
Fletcher as well as with the traditional criminal law theory: for Fletcher 
and pursuant to the traditional understanding, wrongdoing and 
justification mutually exclude each other; for me, they do not.   
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Focusing on the problem of incompatible justifications, I suggested 
that we should revise our understanding of justifications in general.  
Specifically, this article argues that, in certain circumstances, justifiable 
conduct may be wrongful; that in a conflict between two incompatible 
justifications, one side may be more right than the other; and that 
justifications should be viewed not as a homogenous group in which 
each defense has equal importance but, instead, as a hierarchical 
structure, in which the place afforded to a defense is determined by its 
rationale and effect on the rights of others.  The top priority belongs to 
justifications that do not violate rights of others and, in addition, compel 
others to behave in a cooperative way (the public duty defenses).  The 
intermediate priority belongs to justifications that neither violate rights 
of others nor create in others a duty to cooperate (the “special 
relationship” and autonomy defenses).  Finally, the lowest priority 
belongs to the defense of necessity, which, by design, may involve 
violation of rights of innocent, unoffending individuals. 
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